Abstract. This study aims at empirically investigating whether technology incubators help academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations with other organizations, thus increasing the competitiveness of these firms. In doing so, we take into account the specificities of academic hightech start-ups with respect to their non-academic counterparts. We compare the effects of incubation on academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups through econometric estimates using a large sample of Italian firms. Our findings suggest that incubated academic high-tech start-ups do not enjoy any advantages in establishing collaborations with respect to their non-incubated peers. Conversely, technology incubators do help non-academic high-tech start-ups in establishing collaborations with public research organizations. We thus come to the interesting conclusion that the effects of incubation are moderated by the genetic characteristics of incubated firms.
1.

Introduction
Since the mid 1990s, European universities and other public research organizations have been increasingly involved in activities aimed at establishing new high-tech firms (OECD, 1998; Wright et al., 2008, ch. 1) . The establishment of these firms has been seen by their parent organizations as an opportunity to pursue several objectives: i) commercially exploit the results of academic research, ii) contribute to the development of the areas where these organizations were located, and iii) provide an alternative source of employment for academic researchers (Iacobucci et al., 2011) .
Despite high expectations, the performance of the high-tech start-ups established by European public research organizations have been disappointing. In particular, these firms tend to remain small (Degroof and Roberts, 2004) .
Understanding why the high-tech start-ups created by European public research organizations fail to grow has attracted the interest of the scientific community. Many scholars have, thus, started investigating the terms and conditions that may increase the economic competitiveness and favour the development of these firms (for a review, see Rothaermel et al., 2007) .
One possible explanation of the dismal performance of academic high-tech start-ups 1 lies in the genetic characteristics that these firms inherit from their founders (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005; Colombo and Piva, 2008) . Being created by academic personnel with great technical and scientific education and work experience in academic research but limited industry-specific work experience, these firms generally have outstanding technological and scientific competencies, but lack industry-specific and managerial competencies. They also are short of the commercial resources (e.g., brand, sale force, distribution channels) necessary for rapid and effective commercialization of their products and services.
In order to obtain access to these resources and competencies, alliances with other firms could play a crucial role. Indeed, previous studies have highlighted that these arrangements allow high-tech start-ups to fill the resource and competence gaps they suffer from in the early stages of their existence (Pisano, 1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gans and Stern, 2003) . Nevertheless, as the social capital of the founders of academic high-tech start-ups is generally oriented to the public research 1 Academic high-tech start-ups are defined here as high-tech start-ups created by academics, i.e., (fulltime or part-time) personnel of public research organizations and Ph.D. students who were actively involved in academic research immediately before founding the firm (Mustar et al., 2006) . 2 environment, it may prove difficult for these firms to establish collaborations with other firms because of lack of suitable business contacts. In accordance with this view, Colombo and Piva (2012) shows that academic high-tech start-ups are more inclined than non-academic ones to establish technological alliances with and purchase technical services from public research organizations. Conversely, they are not prone to establish alliances with other firms.
In this area, technology incubators may play a valuable enabling role.
Technology incubators are property-based initiatives which provide young entrepreneurial firms with physical facilities and technical and business services (OECD, 1997) , with the aim of promoting firm development (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) . In addition to office space they provide newly founded ventures with a set of services including access to infrastructures and facilities, secretarial support, but also more elaborate services, such as financial consultancy, technical and managerial advise, and assistance in business plan development (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005) .
Moreover, they may assist new ventures in establishing collaborations with a broad range of actors (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2005; Rothschild and Darr, 2005; Bergek and Norrman, 2008) . In particular, technology incubators may foster both formal agreements and informal interactions between the incubated firms and promote the establishment of linkages between them and academic organizations (Schwartz and Hornych, 2010) . Therefore, technology incubators may be regarded as an effective mechanism to help academic high-tech start-ups collaborate with other organizations, thereby effectively contributing to the competitiveness of the former firms. In fact, the location of academic high-tech start-ups in technology incubators is a widespread phenomenon. Notably, incubators have been used by many technology transfer offices to foster the creation of new companies aimed at commercializing the results of academic research (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003) .
The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically whether technology incubators indeed help academic high-tech start-ups to overcome the obstacles they typically encounter in establishing collaborations with other firms. In order to assess the impact of incubation in this domain, we compare the propensity of incubated and non-incubated academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations with third parties. We distinguish collaborations with private firms from those with academic organizations. Moreover, we explore the impact of incubation on the establishment of 3 collaborations also for incubated and non-incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups.
In this way, we check whether the allegedly positive effect of incubation on firms' collaboration activity depends on whether the incubated firms are academic or nonacademic high-tech start-ups. Our analysis is relevant in terms of both theory development and potential policy implications. On the one hand, it contributes to both the literature on academic entrepreneurship and the debate on the effectiveness of technology incubators, as we will extensively discuss in the conclusions. On the other hand, our findings have important implications for officers of both incubators and technology transfer offices and for policy makers in that they highlight the specific challenges that are to be faced to sustain the development of different types of high-tech start-ups.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection procedures and provides some empirical evidence on both academic high-tech startups and technology incubators in Italy. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms, specifies the econometric models, introduces the variables used in our empirical analysis, and presents the results of the estimates. Section 4 discusses the main findings, highlights their contribution to the literature, acknowledges the limitations of the study, identifies new avenues for future research, and presents policy implications.
Data
This section is aimed at describing the database we use in the empirical analysis and presenting some empirical evidence on Italian academic high-tech start-ups and 4 on the phenomenon of technology incubation in Italy. Specifically, Section 2.1 describes the methodology of construction of our dataset. Section 2.2 illustrates the distributions by industry, location and year of foundation of the academic high-tech start-ups included in our database and compares them to the distributions of nonacademic high-tech start-ups. Section 2.3 presents some figures about Italian technology incubators.
Data collection
To study the impact of incubation on the propensity of academic and nonacademic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations we used a sample of 615 [ Table I around here]
The BICs affiliated to the European BIC Network, and 10 university incubators. Table II reports the distributions of these organizations by macroarea of location and year of establishment.
[ Table II around here]
Italian technology incubators are mainly situated in most developed northern regions (53.5% of the total). Quite interestingly, the three groups of incubators mentioned above exhibit significant differences as to their geographical distribution.
While most science parks and university incubators are located in the North of the country (55.2% and 60%, respectively), the percentage of BICs in this area is lower (48.5%). The higher percentage of BICs in the less developed regions of the Centre and South of Italy is in line with the view according to which such initiatives are instrumental to the restructuring and rejuvenation of disadvantaged regions.
As to the year of foundation, most incubators have been established in the Nineties. However, the three groups of incubators again exhibit different distributions across the three decades considered in Table II . While all Italian university incubators have been founded since 2000, with the only exception of the incubator of Politecnico di Torino, which was established in 1999, only 24% of the science parks and 12% of the BICs were established in the last decade.
2 We define a "science park" as a property-based initiative which (i) has formal operational links with centers of knowledge creation, such as universities and (public and/or private) research centers, (ii) is designed to encourage the formation and growth of innovative (generally science-based) businesses, and (iii) has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of technology and business skills to "customer" organizations (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002) . 7
To provide figures on the firms hosted in Italian technology incubators, we surveyed the websites of the 71 incubators identified in Italy and the websites of the national associations they are members of. 3 Altogether, at the beginning of 2010
Italian incubators hosted more than 1,800 companies with more than 13,000 employees.
Empirical analysis
This Section illustrates the empirical analysis. Section 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms. In Section 3.2
we specify the econometric models and describe the (dependent and independent)
variables included in these models. Section 3.3 illustrates the econometric results.
Academic high-tech start-ups, incubation and collaboration activity: qualitative evidence
The sample considered here is composed of 615 out of the 1,646 high-tech startups included in the RITA directory as of January 1 st , 2009. The sample comprises only the firms for which we were able to build a complete dataset relating to the variables of interest. The sample firms included 99 incubated start-ups (16.0% of the sample). 45.4% of the incubated firms were academic start-ups (45 firms). The percentage of academic start-ups out of the 459 non-incubated start-ups was significantly lower: less than 12.4% (57 firms). This evidence indicates that incubation is a much more common phenomenon among academic high-tech start-ups than among their non-academic peers.
[ Table III around here] Table III provides some descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms. The table distinguishes four groups of firms: incubated academic hightech start-ups, non-incubated academic high-tech start-ups, incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups, and non-incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups.
As to the establishment of alliances with other firms, the share of collaborating firms is systematically greater in the incubated categories than in the corresponding 3 We considered the following associations: the Italian Association of Scientific and Technological Parks (APSTI), the Italian association of BICs (BIC Italia Net), the Association of the Italian Incubators and Academic Business Plan Competitions (PNICube), and the Italian Network for the Valorisation of University Research (Netval). 8 non-incubated ones for both academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups.
However, none of these differences are found to be statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. Hence, from this preliminary analysis, we conclude that location in a technology incubator seems to have no positive effects on the ability of neither academic nor non-academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborative relationships with other firms.
However, incubation helps non-academic high-tech start-ups establish collaborations with and purchase consultancy services from public research organisations. The differences are significant at conventional confidence levels.
Conversely, no difference emerges as to this type of relationships between incubated and non-incubated high-tech academic start-ups. It is also noteworthy that we do not find any significant difference in the propensity to establish collaborations of the different types between incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups and academic high-tech start-ups, be they incubated or not. 4 This evidence suggests that incubators' ability to promote the establishment of linkages between incubated firms and academic organizations reduces the advantages that academic high-tech start-ups enjoy in this respect.
In Table III we do not distinguish incubated high-tech start-ups by the type of incubator. However, one may wonder whether science parks, BICs and university incubators have different effects on the collaboration activity of the incubated academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups. In Table A .I of the Appendix we report descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms incubated in science parks, BICs and university incubators. The share of collaborating firms does not differ at conventional confidence levels across the three groups of incubators.
In the Appendix we also further investigate the effects of incubation on the collaboration activity of academic high-tech start-ups by considering the composition of firm founding team. In particular, we distinguish the high-tech start-ups founded by academics only and those created by teams including both academics and nonacademics. The data reported in Table A .II are in line with those shown in Table III: incubation has no effects on the collaboration activity of any academic high-tech startups.
Econometric methodology
We compare the impact of incubation on academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups, by estimating the following Logit models: The 6 dependent variables (see Table IV [ Table IV around here] In addition, we consider founders' prior work experience in other industries than the one of the start-up (OtherWorkExp i ). We also control for founders' managerial competencies through DManager i . DManager i is a dummy variable taking value 1 if one or more founders had a managerial position in a medium-large company prior to the establishment of the firm.
The controls also include the number of years elapsed since firm's foundation (Age i ) and its squared value (SqAge i ), four geographical dummy variables 5 and four industry dummies. 6 Correlation among the explanatory variables is low overall, thus suggesting the absence of any relevant problems of multicollinearity.
Results
[ Table V around here]
The results of the econometric analysis are illustrated in Table V . Let us start from some preliminary considerations about the differences between academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups in the propensity to establish collaborative relationships with third parties. Both DAsu_Inc i and DAsu_NoInc i exhibit negative coefficients (significant at 10%) in Model 2 and positive ones (significant at 10% and 5%, respectively) in Model 6. This is in line with Colombo and Piva (2012) .
Academic high-tech start-ups (be they incubated or not) are relatively less prone to establish technological alliances with other firms, but more likely to acquire consulting services from public research organizations than non-incubated non- For the sake of synthesis we do not discuss here the coefficients of the control variables.
To check the robustness of our results we performed two different tests. First, we checked whether a survivorship bias in data might undermine the empirical analysis on the propensity to establish collaborative relationships with third parties.
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To do so, we focused attention on the RITA 2000 sample. We do have exit data for these firms in the 2000-2003 period. Out of the 401 firms composing the sample, 86 exited before 2003. As a direct way to control for a possible survivorship bias, we adapted a typical Heckman two-step procedure commonly used in empirical studies on firm growth dynamics (e.g., Evans, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994) to our specific framework.
In Based on these estimates, we could compute the Inverse Mills Ratio of firm exit for 383 out of the 615 sample firms. This ratio was then inserted as a control for survivorship bias in the models presented in Table V . This additional variable controls for the unobserved heterogeneity that affects both a firm's probability of being sampled in following years and its propensity to establish collaborative relationships with third parties, allowing more consistent estimates of the parameters of the models presented in Table V .
The estimates shown in the Appendix Table A Second, the results in Table A .IV indicate that academic high-tech start-ups are more likely to be CVC-backed than their non-academic counterparts. This may be a consequence of a greater likelihood of receiving an offer from a CVC investor for academic high-tech start-ups. Indeed, as CVC investments are frequently aimed at opening a "technology window" on a promising new technology (Ernst et al., 2005) , the strong scientific and technological competencies of academic high-tech start-ups may make these firms more attractive for CVC investors than non-academic high-tech start-ups. In spite of these differences, the results of the estimates in Table A .IV indicate that location in a technology incubator does not affect the collaboration activity of academic high-tech start-ups. We may thus conclude that our key findings are not affected by survivorship bias.
The second check of robustness is aimed at taking into account possible unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, there may be unobserved factors (such as the size of founders' network of social contacts) that explain both the probability of being incubated and the probability to establish collaborations. To account for possible unobserved heterogeneity that, if correlated with regressors, may lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest, we run additional estimates replacing the geographical and industry dummies with five industry-and area-specific control variables (see the Appendix Table A .V for a description). These additional estimates are shown in the Appendix Table A .VI. The coefficients of our independent variables are almost unchanged in terms of significance and sign (with the only exception of the coefficient of DNoAsu_Inc i that is not significant in Model 4).
Discussion and conclusions
The present study was aimed at understanding whether technology incubators contribute to the competitiveness of academic high-tech start-ups by helping these firms to establish collaborations with third party organizations. In doing so, we also checked whether incubation differently affects the collaboration activity of academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups.
We have analysed and compared the effects of incubation on academic and nonacademic high-tech start-ups through the estimates of several Logit models using a sample of Italian high-tech start-ups. it easier to collaborate with academia than their non-academic peers, irrespective of incubation. As academic founders possess a wider network of social contacts in the public research sector than non-academic founders, academic high-tech start-ups are more embedded within the scientific community (Murray, 2004) . Hence, the support eventually offered in this domain by technology incubators is useless. More interestingly, location in a technology incubator does not foster academic high-tech start-ups' collaborations with other firms either. This is a missing opportunity for increasing the competitiveness of academic high-tech start-ups. Indeed, because of their genetic characteristics, and the associated lack of industry-specific technical and commercial competencies, academic high-tech start-ups have great incentives to establish this type of collaborations in order to access and take advantage of the competencies and resources possessed by industrial partners, notably in the commercial sphere. However, in spite of these incentives they find it difficult to engage in collaborations with other firms because they lack suitable social capital.
Hence, technology incubators may be a surrogate for academic high-tech start-ups' lack of business contacts, by creating a bridge between these firms and potential industrial partners. However, our findings suggest that in Italy technology incubators have failed to perform this crucial bridging function. They seem to have even reduced the incentives of academic start-ups to obtain CVC-backing, even though the evidence on this issue admittedly is weak.
Second, despite these disappointing results concerning the contribution of technology incubators to academic high-tech start-ups' collaboration activity, our estimates provide evidence of a substantial impact of incubation on the collaboration activity of non-academic high-tech start-ups. In line with the studies which found that incubated firms exhibit a higher propensity to collaborate with academic institutions than comparable non-incubated firms (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2004; Fukugawa, 2006; Yang et al., 2009) development. Thus, it would be interesting to extend the comparative analysis presented in this paper to other countries to check whether and how national institutional characteristics influence the effects of incubation on academic high-tech start-ups and its differential impact on distinct types of high-tech start-ups.
Notwithstanding the limitations of this study, we think that our findings contribute to both the literature on academic entrepreneurship and the research stream on technology incubators. They also are very informative for the officers of incubators and technology transfer offices, and, more generally, for policy makers.
In terms of contribution to the literature on academic entrepreneurship, our analysis adds to the research stream on new firm creation (Rothaermel et al., 2007) .
Several studies in this stream have examined the contribution of incubators to new firm creation (see, e.g., Clarysse et al., 2005; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005a After a period of euphoria about incubating initiatives, doubts were raised about their effectiveness in contributing to economic development (Autio and Klofsten, 1998; Sherman, 1999) . A growing number of scholars have thus started investigating the impact of incubation at the firm level. The evidence provided by these studies is mixed (see, e.g., Siegel et al., 2003; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005b; Squicciarini, 2008; 2009 This study has also interesting policy implications. Our findings highlight a key weakness of Italian technology incubators: they are not very effective in helping academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborative relationships with other firms.
Since 2000 the Italian government has subsidised the creation of several technology incubators by Italian universities with the aim of supporting the establishment and development of newly created firms. Most firms located in these incubators indeed are academic high-tech start-ups. The lack of support offered by technology incubators to the collaborative activity of this type of firms highlighted by our study points to a serious weakness of these initiatives. In order to overcome such a weakness, the officers of technology incubators should enlarge their network of contacts with firms and create more opportunities of interaction between incubated start-ups and non-incubated firms. However, officers of technology incubators and policy makers should be aware that, because of the genetic characteristics of academic high-tech start-ups, these firms that are naturally prone to partner with research organizations, encounter serious difficulties in collaborating with private firms (e.g., due to differences in objectives, language and cognitive frames). In fact, incubation showed a more positive impact on the ability of non-academic high-tech start-ups to establish alliances with other firms, even though this positive effect was confined to technological alliances and was of small magnitude. Whether the difficulties experienced by academic high-tech start-ups make it impossible for technology incubators to foster the collaborative links between incubated academic high-tech start-ups and other private firms is open to debate. Conversely, our findings indicate that another important mission of technology incubators is more likely to prove successful. Italian technology incubators have been able to create an effective bridge between non-academic high-tech start-ups and public research organizations. This is an important contribution to the development of these firms that incubators' officers should duly take into account when deciding about applications by non-academic high-tech start-ups. Our study clearly indicates that discrimination against application from this type of firms would make technology incubators far less successful.
18 Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. 
Variable Description
Dependent variables DCommAllFirm i
One for firms that have established one or more commercial alliances with other firms, zero otherwise.
DTechAllFirm i
One for firms that have established one or more technological alliances with other firms, zero otherwise.
DCVC i
One for firms that have obtained external equity financing from a corporate venture capitalist, zero otherwise.
DCommAllResOrg i
One for firms that have established one or more commercial alliances with public research organizations, zero otherwise.
DTechAllResOrg i
One for firms that have established one or more technological alliances with public research organizations, zero otherwise.
DConsultResOrg i
One for firms that have acquired consultancy services from public research organizations, zero otherwise.
Independent variables DAsu_Inc i
One for academic high-tech start-ups that have been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.
DAsu_NoInc i
One for academic high-tech start-ups that have never been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.
DNoAsu_Inc i
One for non-academic high-tech start-ups that have been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.
Controls
EcoEduc i
Average number of years of economic and/or managerial education of founders at university level.
TechEduc i
Average number of years of scientific and/or technical education of founders at university level.
TechWorkExp i
Average number of years of technical work experience of founders in the same sector of the start-up before firm's foundation.
ComWorkExp i
Average number of years of commercial work experience of founders in the same sector of the start-up before firm's foundation.
OtherWorkExp i
Average number of years of work experience of founders in other sectors than the one of the start-up before firm's foundation.
DManager i
One for firms with one or more founders with a prior management position in a company with more than 100 employees.
Age i
Number of years since firm's foundation.
SqAge i
Squared value of the number of years since firm's foundation. Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses.
For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of industry and geographic area dummies are not reported. Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses. For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of industry and geographic area dummies are not reported. Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses. For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of industry and geographic area dummies are not reported. 
APPENDIX
Variable Description
Competition i
Mean value of the normalised answers of RITA firms' owner-managers to questions concerning the degree of competition in the firm's sector of activity. TechnoOpportunities i Ratio of the number of RITA firms that introduced radically innovative products or services compared to the offer of the industry to the total number of RITA firms in the industry.
Appropriability i
Mean value of the answers of RITA firms' owner-managers to questions concerning the appropriability of technology in the firm's sector of activity measured through a Likert scale from 1 (weak appropriability) to 6 (strong appropriability).
Infrastructures i
Value of the index measuring regional infrastructures in 1992 (mean value among Italian regions=100). HighTechIntensity i Number of high-tech firms per thousand residents in the province where the focal start-up is located (source: ISTAT). Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses.
